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Borste raised the affirmative defense of mental illness, contending
that her credit card use was not
fraudulent because it was an uncontrollable manifestation of her
obsessive-compulsive disorder
("O.C.D."). Consequently, she
claimed, she was unable to formulate the intent required to establish
fraud.
An Objective Test for Intent
The parties agreed that Nordstrom need not show Borste's subjective intent to deceive. Rather,
Nordstrom would have to prove
that Borste exhibited a reckless
disregard for her inability to pay by
continuing to charge items to her
account when she knew or should
have known that she would be
unable to pay for the charges. The
Ninth Circuit had defined this objective standard in In re Dougherty,
84 Bankr. 653 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1988). The Dougherty court had
developed a list of the factors to be
used to determine a debtor's intent
and to determine whether a debtor's credit obligations could be
discharged. The factors considered
included: the sophistication and
financial condition of the debtor,
the nature of the debtor's buying
habits, whether the debtor had
consulted an attorney, and the frequency, timing, and amount of
charges.
Applying the Dougherty factors,
the Borste court found that the
number of charges, thirty-six at
Nordstrom and ninety-two in total,
and the nature of them, most
charges made for luxury items,
were proof of Borste's reckless disregard of her ability to pay when
considered in light of her financial
resources. Borste's net income of
$1,500 to $1,600 per month was
objectively insufficient, according
to the court, to meet her growing
financial obligation to her creditors. At the time of filing for
bankruptcy, Borste owed almost
$30,000 to her consumer creditors
alone. Borste's familiarity with
credit transactions, knowledge of
bankruptcy as an option while she
continued to charge, and sudden
and substantial increase in the
number of charges before filing
demonstrated that she had or
should have had an understanding
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of her inability to pay. Such an
understanding constituted intent
under the law. The court concluded that Borste incurred the charges
with no intent to pay or in reckless
disregard of her inability to do so.
The Defense of Mental Illness
The court noted that a debtor
may rebut a showing of intent in an
action to discharge debt by proving
mental incapacity; however, this
defense failed because the objective standard was so stringent.
Borste's therapist testified that her
O.C.D. manifested itself not in a
lack of comprehension, but in depression and an inability to control
spending. Borste argued that such
manifestations of her O.C.D. took
away her ability to devise intent.
The court found immaterial
Borste's subjective knowledge that
she could not meet the obligations
owed. The court asked instead
whether Borste's O.C.D. rendered
her unable to understand the consequences of her actions and found
that it did not.
The court distinguished Borste's
condition from that of the debtor
in In re Fontenot, 89 Bankr. 575
(Bankr. W.D. La. 1988). In that
case, the debtor successfully argued that his severe manic depression could rebut a showing of a
debtor's fraudulent intent in a similar action for discharge of debt. In
Fontenot, the court found the debtor's mental illness was the direct
cause of both his spending behavior and his unreasonable belief in
his ability to pay his increasing
financial obligations. In contrast,
Borste's belief that she would be
able to pay was based on her past
experience, not on her illness. She
had testified that she thought of
her resources not in terms of her
salary but in terms of her previous
ability to pay, which often depended on her success in obtaining
more credit. The court rejected
Borste's defense of O.C.D. because
Borste failed to prove that she
lacked control of her conduct, let
alone that she was beyond under-standing the consequences of her
behavior.
Credit Card Debt Was Not

Dischargeable
The court expressed sympathy

toward Borste but stopped short of
relieving her of responsibility for
her behavior. The court concluded
that Borste's conduct showed a
reckless disregard for the seriousness of her obligations. After
Borste knew or should have known
that she lacked the ability to pay,
she continued to incur numerous
charges for luxury items on her
Nordstrom and other accounts.
Consequently, Borste's debt to
Nordstrom was not dischargeable
in bankruptcy.
Frank J. Troppe

Trademark Licensor
Held Not Liable To
Indemnify Because It
Did Not Substantially
Participate In The
Production, Marketing,
Or Distribution Of
Defective Product
In Burkert v. PetrolPlus of Naugatuck, Inc., 216 Conn. 65, 579
A.2d 26 (1990), the Supreme Court
of Connecticut examined whether
a distributor of a defective product
was entitled to indemnification by
the licensor of the trademark under
which the defective product was
marketed. The court determined
that the distributor was not entitled to indemnification because the
trademark licensor did not participate in the production, marketing,
or distribution of the product.
Factual Background
General Motors Corporation
("GM") was the trademark licensor of Dexron II, a type of automatic transmission fluid. Through a
licensing program, GM permitted
authorized third parties to use the
Dexron II trademark on transmission fluids meeting GM performance standards. GM did not control the actual contents of the
transmission fluids meeting GM's
performance standards. The contents of transmission fluids produced by GM's licensees were
trade secrets to which GM had no
access. Furthermore, GM received
no royalties or other financial benefits from the licensing program.
(continued on page 70)
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The aim of the program was quality control rather than marketing
the Dexron II product.
Petrol Plus of Naugatuck, Inc.
("Petrol Plus"), a petroleum products distributor, sold automatic
transmission fluid to automatic
transmission repair shops. Beginning in 1981, Petrol Plus obtained
its supply of Dexron II from Atlantic Coast Oil Company ("Atlantic
Coast"). Atlantic Coast, a GM licensee, purchased its supply of
transmission fluid from an "original formulator" which developed
and produced its own proprietary
automatic transmission fluid to
which Atlantic Coast attached the
Dexron II trademark.
In 1983, a customer complained
to Petrol Plus about the color of the
Dexron II. After receiving numerous customer complaints, Petrol
Plus suspended distribution of the
bulk transmission fluid in August
1983. Petrol Plus informed its customers that they should stop using
the product. Petrol Plus later
learned that Atlantic Coast had
supplied it with a Dexron II look
alike, a base oil dyed red.
Procedural Background

Retail purchasers of the Petrol
Plus oil initiated this action against
Petrol Plus to recover for damages
caused by the defective automatic
transmission fluid. Petrol Plus
filed third party complaints against
Atlantic Coast and GM, seeking
indemnification for the settlement
expenses with respect to the retail
purchasers. The first party action
settled. The third party claims
were tried to a jury. The Superior
Court for the Judicial District of
New Haven entered judgment in
favor of GM and against Atlantic
Coast. Petrol Plus appealed the
judgment in favor of GM. The
Supreme Court of Connecticut
transferred the case to its docket
and affirmed the judgment of the
trial court.
The Connecticut Supreme Court's

Decision
On appeal before the Supreme
Court of Connecticut, Petrol Plus

argued that the trial court should
have held, as a matter of law, that
GM was a "product seller" for
purposes of the Products Liability
Act ("PLA"), Conn. Gen. Stat. §
52-572m(a) (1985), and therefore
was liable for indemnification to
Petrol Plus under the PLA. Second, Petrol Plus contended that the
court gave unnecessarily limited
instruction on Petrol Plus's common law theories of indemnity.
Third, Petrol Plus argued that the
court erred in refusing to charge
the jury on Petrol Plus's Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act
("CUTPA"), Conn. Gen. Stat. §
42-11 Ob (1985), claim against GM.
Petrol Plus lost all three challenges.
Products Liability Act
The PLA, Conn. Gen. Stat. §
52-572m(a) (1985), defined a product seller as "any person or entity
including a manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor or retailer who is
engaged in the business of selling
such products whether the sale is
for resale or for use or consumption." The Connecticut Supreme
Court held that GM did not fall
within the definition of a product
seller. First, GM did not produce
or sell the product. Second, GM
merely allowed others to use its
Dexron II trademark. Third, GM
was not compensated in any way.
The Connecticut Supreme Court
stated that without additional participation in the stream of commerce, a trademark licensor was
not a product seller under the PLA.
Thus, the court affirmed the trial
court's decision and held that GM
was not a product seller and therefore Petrol Plus was not entitled to
indemnification. However, the
court also held that the PLA did
not prevent Petrol Plus from asserting its common law indemnification claims against GM, as an
entity not fitting the definition of
product seller.
Common Law Theories

The Connecticut Supreme
Court stated that in order for Petrol Plus to recover from GM at
common law, Petrol Plus must
present a theory of liability that
would support an indemnification
award against GM. Petrol Plus
asserted three separate theories of

recovery. First, Petrol Plus argued
that under the Lanham TradeMark Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §
1064(5)(A) (West 1963 & Supp.
1991), GM had an affirmative duty
to supervise its licensees' production and distribution of Dexron II
transmission fluid in order to ensure the quality of the product.
Petrol Plus contended that GM's
lack of oversight demonstrated its
negligence.
The court found that the case
law cited by Petrol Plus did not
suggest that a trademark owner's
failure to exercise control would
subject the owner to tortious liability for damages caused by a defective product bearing its trademark.
The court noted that the concept
that a licensor must exercise control over its licensees only applied
in cases of trademark abandonment. The court found that Petrol
Plus did not show that GM's actions or inaction were the active
and primary cause of the damages,
as required for proof of negligence.
Since GM did not affirmatively
exercise control over its licensees,
Petrol Plus had no grounds for
indemnification.
Second, Petrol Plus argued that
GM, as an "apparent manufacturer," was so involved in the stream
of commerce that it should be held
liable under theories of negligence
and strict liability. Petrol Plus contended that GM, through its licensing program, should be treated as
the manufacturer of Dexron II; by
permitting others to use its trademark, GM placed Dexron II in the
market as its own product.
The Connecticut Supreme
Court held that liability under the
apparent manufacturer doctrine
required that a licensor have taken
a significant part in the manufacturing, marketing, or distribution
of the defective product. GM had
no involvement with the defective
Dexron II transmission fluid, other
than the leasing of the trademark.
Thus, GM had not met the threshold involvement level. GM was not
liable to indemnify Petrol Plus
under strict tort liability and negligence claims based on the apparent
manufacturer doctrine.
Third, Petrol Plus argued that
GM was liable for breaches of
implied warranties of merchantVolume 3 Number 2/Winter, 1991
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ability and fitness for a particular
purpose and for breach of an express warranty. Under the Connecticut Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC"), a party may only
recover breach of warranty damages against a seller or a merchant.
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 42a-2-313 2-315 (1985). The Connecticut
UCC defined a seller as a "person
who sells or contracts to sell
goods." Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 42a-2103(l)(d) (1985). The court previously held that GM was not in the
business of selling Dexron II. Thus,
the court concluded that Petrol
Plus could not recover under the
UCC warranty provisions, since
GM, by definition, was not a "seller."
Petrol Plus also argued it should
receive indemnification based on
the common law theory of warranty. However, the court determined
that a party would have to establish
significant involvement in the
stream of commerce to recover
under this theory. The court found
that Petrol Plus did not prove this
threshold participation by GM.
The court thus rejected Petrol
Plus's indemnification claim based
on a common law warranty theory.
Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act
CUTPA, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4211 Ob(a) (1985), provides that "no
person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce." In its definition of trade or
commerce, the statute includes advertising, selling, and distributing
goods. Once again, the court held
that GM did not fit the statutory
definition. GM did not advertise
the Dexron II transmission fluid
nor did it sell or distribute the
defective transmission fluid. Thus,
the Connecticut Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's refusal to
charge the jury with respect to
Petrol Plus's CUTPA claim.
Suzanne Kuzmenka
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Investors Who Relied
On Tax Opinions May
Not Recover Back
Taxes And Interest Paid
For Disallowed
Deductions
In Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko
& Casey, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1990),
the Supreme Court of New York,
Appellate Division denied recovery to investors of back taxes and
interest which they were required
to pay to the Internal Revenue
Service after the deductions they
took were disallowed. The investors had relied on the opinions of
two law firms and invested in a
coal mining tax shelter. In addition, the court held that the investors could not amend their complaints to assert additional claims
for fraud and breach of fiduciary
duty.
Background
On December 16, 1977, the
United States Treasury Department ("Treasury") amended one
of its regulations to disallow deductions from gross income for
advance minimum royalty payments in connection with mineral
properties. Treas. Reg. § 1.6123(b)(3) (1977). An advance minimum royalty is a fixed amount of
money to be paid to the owner of
mineral property before mining
begins, as opposed to periodic royalty payments made in proportion
to the amount of minerals mined.
Three days later, the Internal Revenue Service ("I.R.S.") revised a
revenue ruling to provide that taxpayers may not take an immediate
deduction for the full amount of
the advance minimum royalty payment but must take deductions for
such payments only in the year in
which the corresponding minerals
are extracted. Rev. Rul. 77-489,
1977 I.R.B. 51.
Prior to these Treasury and
I.R.S. releases, Esanu, Katsky and
Korins (the "Esanu firm"), a law
firm, had structured Logan Properties Program ("Logan"), a coal
mining business. Logan appeared
to provide investors an opportunity for immediate deduction of an

advance minimum royalty to be
paid by Logan. By December 21,
1977, following publication of the
government releases, the Esanu
firm withdrew its opinion with
respect to the Logan investment
program. The Esanu firm advised
the operating manager of Logan
that while there was a basis in law
for taxpayers to deduct Logan's
advance minimum royalty payment, there was also a significant
chance that the I.R.S. would disallow such a deduction in part or in
full.
Logan then asked Shea Gould
Climenko and Casey ("Shea
Gould") for an opinion letter to be
included in its promotion materials. On December 20, 1977, Shea
Gould opined that there was a
reasonable basis for concluding
that the revenue ruling was invalid.
However, Shea Gould advised that
taxpayers who invested in Logan
might, nevertheless, would be unable to deduct the advance minimum royalty payment immediately upon investing in Logan if the
I.R.S. successfully applied the distortion of income concept.
On December 30, 1977, George
Alpert ("Alpert") and Lee Wolfman ("Wolfman") each invested
$52,500 in Logan. Alpert and
Wolfman based these investment
decisions on the tax opinions of the
Esanu firm and Shea Gould. On
their 1977 tax returns, Alpert and
Wolfman each deducted $ 216,645
for advance minimum royalty payments for the right to mine coal.
On their 1978 returns, each deducted $10,893 for the advance
minimum royalty payments. In
1984 and 1985, the I.R.S. disallowed the deductions taken by Alpert and Wolfman in 1977 and
1978. Alpert and Wolfman had to
pay the tax deficiencies plus interest.
In 1984, Alpert and Wolfman
each commenced actions against
the advising law firms for fraudulent misrepresentation. In the lawsuits, Alpert and Wolfman sought
lost profits and recovery of the tax
benefits they would have received if
they had not relied on the opinions
of the Esanu firm and Shea Gould
and had instead invested in a viable
tax shelter. Alpert and Wolfman
(continued on page 72)
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